NOTES
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: JURISDICTION
OVER FOREIGN EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES1

A

RECENT

assertion of jurisdiction by the National Labor Relations

Board in Peninsular & Occidental Steamship Co., 2 resulted in the
direction of a representation election among ships' crews composed
predominantly of non-resident aliens hired by a Liberian corporation to
serve aboard two vessels of Liberian registry owned by Liberian companies. The significance of this decision is best appreciated against the
background of the recent Supreme Court decision in Benz v. Compania
Naviera Hidalgo, S.A.,' which held that the Labor Management Relations Act4 was not intended by Congress to apply to disputes between
a foreign ship and its foreign crew.
The action in the Benz case was for damages resulting from picketing
of the S. S. Riviera while the vessel was temporarily in an American port.
The suit was instituted in the United States District Court for Oregon
which, in accepting jurisdiction, rejected the contention that the Labor
Management Relations Act pre-empted the field, holding, rather, that
the Act does not extend to a dispute between a foreign ship and its
foreign crew.5 The Court of Appeals6 affirmed in part and reversed in
part without reaching the question whether the Labor Management
1 The scope of this article does not extend to treatment of the Board's so-called
"jurisdictional standards" which represent voluntary limitations on the exercise of
its jurisdiction. These standards are based on minimum annual dollar volumes of
business below which the Board feels that assertion of jurisdiction over the operations
of an employer will not effectuate the policies of the Act. The existence of these
self-imposed jurisdictional standards has, in combination with the supremacy clause of
the Constitution, created the familiar "no man's land" in the field of labor relations.
See Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
By contrast, the present
discussion is concerned with the Board's legal jurisdiction.
2i2o N.L.R.B. No. x47 (.958).
'353 U.S. 138 (1957).
Coincidentally, this case also involved a ship of Liberian
registry. However, the ship was owned by a Panamanian corporation and its crew was
entirely non-American.

'49 STAT. 449, as amended, 61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 151

(1952).

353 U.S. at 141.
'Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 233 F.2d 6z ( 9 th Cir. 1956). Reversal
in the Court of Appeals was based on Oregon law to the effect that a judgment could
not be entered against the unions as unincorporated associations. Judgments against
individual union officials were affirmed.
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Relations Act extended to the controversy in question. On certiorari,
limited to the issue of the Act's application, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the position of the District Court, stating 7 that there is
nothing in the legislative history of the Act to indicate that Congress
intended it should apply to ".

.

. labor disputes between nationals of

other countries operating ships under foreign laws."'
7 353 U.S. at 14.3.

'This is at least questionable.

The Court relied heavily upon a single statement by

Representative Hartley: "The bill herewith reported has been formulated as a bill of
rights both for American workingmen and for their employers." (Emphasis added by
the Court.) H.R. REP. No. 245, 8oth Cong., istSess. 4 (1947). From this statement
the Court concluded that "what was said inescapably describes the boundaries of the
Act as including only the workingmen of our own country and its possessions." 353
U.S. at 144. A fair reading of Hartley's statement, however, could lead to the conclusion that the key phrase is "bill of rights" rather than "American." Certainly the
statement is not exclusionary and, in context, has clear reference to §§ 7 and 8 as well
as to §§ 2(6) and 2(7) of the Act. See x LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT 295 (1948). Furthermore, this interpretation of congressional intent seems to conflict with the Court's oft-quoted dictum that the term
"caffecting commerce," under which the Board exercises its jurisdiction, was intended
by Congress to exploit the full extent of its power under the commerce clause of the
Constitution. Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944).
The ambiguity of this language becomes apparent when it is applied to facts such
as the Board finds in the instant case. When the Court speaks of "nationals of other
countries operating ships," the reference may be to the owner or to the officers and
crew or to both. Hartley's remark that the Act was for "American workingmen" and
the Court's assertion that the Act has application to "only the workingmen of our
country and its possessions" also admit of varying interpretations. If this language
is construed as limiting the Act's scope to United States citizens only, then the cases in
which the Board held that alien status did not remove an employer from the jurisdiction
of the Act were in error. The most recent of such cases was decided after Benz.
Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione, ii8 N.L.R.B." 1113 (1957). See also
Cities Service Oil Co. of Pennsylvania (Marine Division), 87 N.L.R.B. 324 (1949);
Seidmon d.b.a. Southwestern Co., io2 N.L.R.B. 1492 (1953) i Brown Co., io9 N.L.R.B.
173 (1954). A citizenship limitation is, however, inconsistent with the language of
the Court, for if the Act covers all "working men . . . of our possessons," it, of necessity, covers some non-citizens, e.g., residents of Guam. Furthermore, neither Hartley's
"American workingmen" nor the Court's "workingmen of our own country" seems
to require any consideration of citizenship; domicile or place of employment seemingly
would meet the implication of those statements equally as well as citizenship and would
also be consonant with past Board practice. Under such a construction alien seamen
could be considered "workingmen of our country" in that they man ships which
regularly sail from a domestic port, carry cargo and passengers principally of United
States origin, and are under the continuous and complete operational control of a
domestic corporation.
The import of the Court's reference to operation "under foreign laws" is not
without ambiguity. In the Benz case, the ship was not merely registered in Liberia, but
also had opened articles of agreement which incorporated conditions prescribed by the
British Maritime Board pertaining to wages and hours of employment. What in-
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In reaching what only on the surface appears to be an opposite result,
the Board in the instant case distinguished the Benz decision on the
ground of actual ownership of the vessels, resorting to the familiar tactic
of ignoring the existence of a corporate shell operating as an instrumentality of another legal person.' The ownership and chartering arrangement under which the ships in the instant case were operated presents
an interesting picture of corporate sham. Prior to August, 1955, both
ships sailed under the American flag and were owned and operated by
Peninsular and Occidental Steamship Company (hereinafter P&O), a
Connecticut corporation. P&O decided to transfer the ships to foreign
registry in order to avoid a requirement 0 that vessels of American
registry be manned with crews seventy-five per cent of which are
American citizens and, thus, to be able to hire foreign crews whose wages
in several classifications were about half those being paid American
seamen. The ships were transferred to two Liberian corporations, the
White Steamship Company and the Blue Steamship Company, both
wholly owned by P&O and apparently organized for the sole purpose of
spections, if any, wth respect to safety, sanitation, etc., the vessel underwent in the
United States does not appear in the Court's decision. In the present case, the ships had
Liberian registry and with that their foreign contracts seemed to end. They were
inspected by appropriate agencies of the Government of the United States, and the
shipping articles are an old form of United States articles apparently containing nothing
required by Liberia which is not also required by the United States. When applied to
the facts found by the Board, in the instant case, the problem hinges upon whether,
in the Court's view, mere foreign registry constitutes "operating . . . under foreign
laws."
9 In the Benz case, the Court dealt with a bona fide corporation owned entirely by
foreign stockholders and carrying on a substantial shipping business. No member of the
crew was an American citizen or resident. The voyage originated in Bremen, Germany,
where the crew signed British articles of agreement for a voyage of 2 years or until
the ship should return to a European port. The sole American contact was the ship's
temporary stop in an American port for the limited purposes of making repairs, taking
on a cargo and completing an insurance survey. By contrast, the ships involved in the
case before the Board regularly operated between Miami or Tampa, Florida, and
Havana, Cuba. The ships' officers were American and almost 1/5 of the unlicensed
crew aboard each vessel were either American citizens or residents. Aboard one ship
over 4/5 of the crew had signed ships articles in the United States, while aboard the
other, 1/3 of the crew had signed on in the United States.
'oIt appears that the Board has accepted this detail of the reason given by the
employer for the transfer because it is unimportant to the decision. The statute which
the employer asserts to impose this requirement, states only, hnter alia, that 75% of the
crew in all departments must be able to understand any order given by the officers of
the ship. 49 STAT. 1935 (1936), as amended, 6o STAT. 1097 (1946), 46 U.S.C. §
672(a) (1952). It may be that in some ports the effect of either requirement would
be practically the same.
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taking title to the two ships. Green Trading Company, a third Liberian
corporation organized by P&O, then leased both vessels under a bareboat
charter, assuming full responsibility for their maintenance, repair and
insurance, and further agreeing to pay certain sums each month as
rental. On the same day, Green Trading entered into a time sub-charter
with P&O, under the terms of which P&O was given authority to determine the trading limits of the vessels and was assigned responsibility
for maintaining and operating the ships at its own expense, including
such items as repairs and victualing. The remaining function of Green
Trading was to employ a full complement of officers and crew for the
vessels and to pay wages, including payroll taxes, and other employee
benefits. It was provided, however, that P&O would reimburse Green
Trading for all these expenses and that P&O would have the right
to fire for cause any master, officer, or member of the crew. The Connecticut corporation further assumed all responsibilities with respect to
insuring the ships and, significantly, the rent which P&O agreed to pay
monthly to Green Trading exactly corresponded to the amounts which
Green Trading had agreed to pay the Blue and the White Steamship
Companies under its charter of the vessels. In further support of its
finding that all three of the Liberian corporations were mere instrumentalities of P&O, the Board pointed to the fact that all of the directors, officers and operating agents of these corporations were in the
employ of P&O.
The picture of sham hardly could be more complete: All of the
Liberian corporations were mere paper shells, each performing a single
function for P&O-that of acting as employer of the crew in the case of
Green Trading, and that of holding legal title as a foreign national in
the cases of the Blue and White Steamship Companies-while complete
beneficial ownership and control of the ships and power to deal directly
with the crew as employer remained in the hands of the original owner,
a Connecticut corporation owned by American citizens. Thus, the Benz
case and the instant decision present situations at opposite poles of corporate reality. Counsel who now would take advantage of the rule
enunciated in Benz for the purpose of avoiding application of the Act
must explore the middle ground, seeking that degree of corporate
reality which will satisfy the Board that the party before it is a true
foreign national without its jurisdiction. 1
11 In at least one case, even before the Benz ruling, the Board declined jurisdiction

where there were insufficient American contracts. In Compania Maritima Sansoc
Limitada, S.A., an administrative decision rendered May i, 195o (CCH N.L.R.B. Deci-
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The interpretation of congressional intent in the Benz decision rests
upon a sound policy of refraining from interfering ,mnecessarily with
foreign nationals. Yet even foreign vessels may significantly affect the
American labor market where they habitually operate out of American
ports, sign on crews in the United States and are able, because of foreign
registry, to hire seamen who will work for less than the prevailing wage.
The Board's refusal mechanically to apply the Benz ruling in the instant
case is, for this reason alone, commendable, and, in fact, the policy
underlying the Benz decision is not sacrificed by application of American
laws.
Future questions of representation similarly affecting the American
labor market in the shipping industry may involve foreign subsidiaries
not created primarily for legal maneuvering by a domestic parent, but
which carry on a bona fide shipping business extending to United States
ports. Though unable to disregard such a subsidiary as a paper shell, the
Board might well extend its present policy by asserting jurisdiction under
a theory previously employed in a different jurisdictional context: For
the purpose of determining whether an employer has sufficient annual
volume of business to meet its monetary jurisdictional standards, 12 the
Board has frequently regarded two corporations as a single employer
because of common ownership and centralized control of operations,
administration, and labor relations policies.'8 This treatment of two
io,oSx, not officially reported), the Board sustained the Regional
sions, 195o-95x,
Director's action dismissing a petition on the grounds that the internal economy of
a vessel of foreign registry and ownership was involved. The ship was registered in
Panama and belonged to a Panamanian corporation in which the majority of stockholders were Greek nationals, although over 1/3 of the stock was owned by ± United
States citizens. Although it is not clear from the report whether the Board felt that
it was powerless to deal with the employer or merely that assertion of jurisdiction
would not effectuate the policies of the Act, it was apparently a recognition of the
general principle of international law that a ship is part of the territory whose flag
it flies. See U.S. v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, x55-56 (1933). The Board has asserted
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation doing business in Puerto Rico. The Royal Bank
See also, Delta Match
of Canada (San Juan Branch), 67 N.L.R.B. 403 (1946).
Corporation, ioz N.L.R.B. 1400 (1953) at n. 2. Furthermore, it has been held that,
"although the Board does not have jurisdiction over foreign nationals as such, it does
have jurisdiction over unfair labor practices occurring in this country and affecting
Washington-Oregon Shingle Weaver's District Council d.b.a.
foreign commerce2
Sound Shingle Co., ioi N.L.R.B. 1i59, xx61 (x95z)i Moore Dry Dock Co. 92
N.L'R.B. 547, 558-56o, n. 17 (195o); Norris Grain Co. v. Nordaas, 232 Minn. 9i,
103-109, 46 N.W.zd 94, 102-104 (1950).
1' See note i supra.
Cf. Ozark
"8Brown and Root Caribe, Inc., 559 NL.R.B. No. iio (1957).
Hardwood Co., 1i9 N.L.R.B. No. 129 (1957), an unfair labor practice case where
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or more legal entities as a single employer for purposes of asserting
jurisdiction under the Act has been approved by the courts. 4 The mere
fact that the employer is an alien corporation should not affect application of the rationale under which closely integrated enterprises are
treated as a single employer. Nor should the political considerations
involved in applying the laws of one country to persons and property
of another nation present any serious difficulty in such a case, for it is
well established in international law that foreign nationals submit themselves to the jurisdiction of any nation irtto whose territory they voluntarily enter.' 5 The principle of international comity, 6 allowing matters involving only the internal economy and discipline of a foreign vessel to
be governed by the "law of the flag," 7 is not defeated where there is
regular and frequent use of American port facilities and the labor of
American residents.
An employer subject to the Labor Management Relations Act is
bound with obligations' 8 of indefinite duration which often require enforcement. Where a ship is only briefly in American waters, as in the
Benz case,"9 certification of a bargaining representative would seem impractical for lack of opportunity to enforce the bargaining obligation.
On the other hand, foreign ownership per se should present no such
difficulty where the ship regularly operates out of American ports, and
where the employer maintains offices and agents in the United States or
may be reached through a closely integrated domestic parent.
a successor employer was held liable for actions of its predecessor on grounds that
it was a mere alter ego of the other company.
,NLRB v. Jones Sausage Co., 42 L.R.R.M. 2467 (CA 4 th 1958)5 cf., Regal
Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945).
"' It is a recognized rule in the United States that the territory subject to its jurisdiction includes land area under its dominion and control, ports, harbors, bays and other
enclosed arms of the sea along its coast and a marginal belt of the sea extending from
the coastline outward, a marine league or three nautical miles. Cunard S.S. Co. v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923). The Board has followed the general rule of international law that one government will not exercise official (including administrative)
functions within the territory of another government. Detroit & Canada Tunnel Corp.,
83 N.L.R.B. 727 (1949).
', See Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A.,
353 U.S. 138, 142 (957).
"RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934), followed in Kyriakos v. Goulandris,
151 F.2d 132 (zd Cir. 1945) (Jones Act). Cf., Compania Maritima Sansoc Limitada,
S.A., note xi supra.
" E.g., the obligation to bargain collectively in good faith with the representative
of a majority of his employees in an appropriate bargaining unit which is imposed by
S8(a))(5) of the Act.
"' See note 3 suPra.
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Shipowners have often found foreign registry of merchant vessels
efficacious in avoiding onerous domestic laws and regulations, thus
affording savings in taxes and operating costs. The practice of foreign
registry has, for this reason, become an international problem of some
magnitude.20 The instant decision seems desirable for the additional
reasons that it partially nullifies an attempt to avoid application of
several American laws,2 and is consistent with treatment accorded.
2
similar cases by federal courts in suits under the Jones Act 2
"°During 1958, 3 international organizations have discussed the problem: The
International Chamber of Shipping at its annual meeting; the United Nations Conference
at Geneva, Switzerland, on the Law of the Sea; and the maritime session of the
International Labor Conference. The N. Y. Times, Mar. z8, 1958, p. $o:2.
"Avoidance of the requirement that 75% of the crew be United States citizens has
already been mentioned. See note 1o supra. On the basis of a letter submitted with
copies of the time sub-charters but without a hearing or other investigation, the
Internal Revenue Service ruled as follows:
"We have concluded that the relationship of employer and employee exists, for
Federal employment tax purposes, between the Green Trading Company and the
officers and crew members. . . . In our opinion the controls retained under the subcharter by Green Trading Company over the hiring, selection, rate of pay and discharge of the officers and crew members are sufficient to establish an employment relationship between the company and such individuals. Although the services are to be performed to some extent in accordance with instructions of [P&O], the Green Trading
Company does not relinquish and [P&O] does not acquire such a right of control and
direction over such individuals as would dissolve the employer-employee relationship
existing between Green Trading Company and the individuals. The information presented indicates that the Green Trading Company is responsible for the general navigation of the vessels and controls the performance of the officers and crew members."
Employer's Exhibit No. 3 in case No. 12-RC-24z.
22 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1953).
This Act extends to seamen
the same rights in actions against employers for damages resulting from personal injuries in connection with their employment as are extended to railway employees under
the Federal Employer's Liability Act. It has been held that the "law of the flag" rule,
which historically determines conflict of laws problems in this area of international
maritime law, is not to be mechanically applied where the nationality of registry and
ownership differ. Gerradin v. United Fruit Co., 6o F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1932), cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 642 (1932). Even where American citizens insert a foreign corporation as additional insulation, immunity from liability may not be achieved if the ultimate
ownership is American. Zielinski v. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, x1 3 F. Supp. 93

(S.D.N.Y. 19sq).

